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A CRITIQUE OF HODEL V. VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND
RECLAMATION ASSOCIATION
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 3, 1980, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia declared substantial portions of the Federal Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 19771 (hereinafter "the Surface
Mining Act" or "the Act") to be unconstitutional in Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Association v. Andrus.2 Specifically, the district
court found 3 that section 515(d) and (e) of the Act4 were in contravention
of the tenth amendment,5 that sections 515(d)-(e) and 5226 of the Act
constituted an unconstitutional taking of private property without just
compensation in violation of the fifth amendment7 and that sections 5188
and 5211 of the Act deprived coal operators of their fifth amendment
right to procedural due process. 10
The Secretary of the Interior, the defendant in the district court, per-
fected an appeal directly to the United States Supreme Court."' On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court was faced with four principal issues: (1) whether
Congress exceeded its authority under the commerce clause in enacting
1. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445
(codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979)). On August 3, 1977, President Carter
signed the Surface Mining Act into law. The bill had been passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives on July 21, 1977, and by the Senate on July 20, 1977. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 493,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Congress began to consider actively the regulation of surface
mining in 1971. S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 95-218, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 57, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 593, 595. Twice previ-
ously Congress had attempted to provide a comprehensive surface mining act, but both
times President Ford vetoed the bill. H.R. REP. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 140, 141,
reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 672-73. See generally Symposium,
The National Coal Issue, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 553 (1979).
2. 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980).
3. Id. at 431-35.
4. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d), (e) (Supp. III 1979).
5. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." U.S. CONsT. amend X.
6. 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (Supp. I1 1979).
7. 483 F. Supp. at 436-42.
8. 30 U.S.C. § 1268 (Supp. III 1979).
9. 30 U.S.C. § 1271 (Supp. III 1979).
10. 483 F. Supp. at 442-48.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1959).
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the Surface Mining Act; (2) whether various performance standards
under the Act violated the tenth amendment; (3) whether the Act, on its
face, amounted to an unconstitutional taking in violation of the just com-
pensation clause of the fifth amendment; and (4) 'vhether the Act's en-
forcement provisions denied coal operators their procedural due process
rights in violation of the fifth amendment.12 The Supreme Court in an
unanimous decision affirmed the constitutionality of the challenged provi-
sions and reversed the district court's decision.13
II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE SURFACE MINING ACT1 4
The Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 was
passed after six years of heated and intense debate between environmen-
talists and the coal industry. 5 The Act is a comprehensive statute
designed to provide national performance standards in the coal mining
industry so that society and the environment will be adequately protected
from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations.' s The Act is
divided into two phases: first, the interim regulatory phase; and second,
the permanent regulatory program.
The Act also created a new administrative agency, the Office of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (hereinafter "OSM")'7 whose func-
tioni8 is to enforce the statutory provisions applicable to the coal industry
12. Brief for Appellant at ii, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101
S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
13. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981). Justice
Rehnquist's separate opinion concurring in the result is found in the companion case of
Hodel v. Indiana, 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981).
14. For an extensive review of the Federal Act, see Dale, The Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 863 (1978); Eichbaum & Buente, The Land
Restoration Provisions of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act: Constitutional
Considerations, 4 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 227 (1980); Friedman & Siedzikowski, Federal and
State Regulatory Authority Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 1053 (1980); Kite, The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977: An Overview of Reclamation Requirements and Implementation, 13 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 703 (1978). See also Brion, Federal Regulation of Surface Mining in Vir-
ginia, 67 VA. L. REV. 329 (1981); Note, The Constitutionality of the Federal Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 13 IND. L. REV. 923 (1980).
15. See note 1 supra.
16. 101 S. Ct. at 2356; 483 F. Supp. at 428; 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. III 1979).
17. 30 U.S.C. § 1211(a) (Supp. III 1979).
18. 30 U.S.C. § 1211(c) (Supp. III 1979) provides:
(c) Duties of Secretary.
The Secretary, acting through the Office, shall-
(1) administer the programs for controlling surface coal mining operations which
are required by this chapter; review and approve or disapprove State programs for
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during the interim phase. 19 After the interim phase is completed, section
controlling surface coal mining operations and reclaiming abandoned mined lands;
make those investigations and inspections necessary to insure compliance with this
chapter; conduct hearings, administer oaths, issue subpoenas, and compel the at-
tendance of witnesses and production of written or printed material as provided for
in this chapter; issue cease-and-desist orders; review and vacate or modify or ap-
prove orders and decisions; and order the suspension, revocation, or withholding of
any permit for failure to comply with any of the provisions of this chapter or any
rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto;
(2) publish and promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purposes and provisions of this chapter;
(3) administer the State grant-in-aid program for the development of State pro-
grams for surface and [sic] mining and reclamation operations provided for in sub-
chapter V of this chapter;
(4) administer the program for the purchase and reclamation of abandoned and
unreclaimed mined areas pursuant to subchapter IV of this chapter;
(5) administer the surface mining and reclamation research and demonstration
project authority provided for in this chapter;
(6) consult with other agencies of the Federal Government having expertise in the
control and reclamation of surface mining operations and assist States, local gov-
ernments, and other eligible agencies in the coordination of such programs;
(7) maintain a continuing study of surface mining and reclamation operations in
the United States;
(8) develop and maintain an Information and Data Center on Surface Coal Mining,
Reclamation, and Surface Impacts of Underground Mining, which will make such
data available to the public and the Federal, regional, State, and local agencies
conducting or concerned with land use planning and agencies concerned with sur-
face and underground mining and reclamation operations;
(9) assist the States in the development of State programs for surface coal mining
and reclamation operations which meet the requirements of this chapter, and at
the same time reflect local requirements and local environmental and agricultural
conditions;
(10) assist the States in developing objective scientific criteria and appropriate pro-
cedures and institutions for determining those areas of a State to be designated
unsuitable for all or certain types of surface coal mining pursuant to section 1272 of
this title;
(11) monitor all Federal and State research programs dealing with coal extraction
and use and recommend to Congress the research and demonstration projects and
necessary changes in public policy which are designated to (A) improve feasibility
of underground coal mining, and (B) improve surface mining and reclamation tech-
niques directed at eliminating adverse environmental and social impacts;
(12) cooperate with other Federal agencies and State regulatory authorities to min-
imize duplication of inspections, enforcement, and administration of this chapter;
and
(13) perform such other duties as may be provided by law and relate to the pur-
poses of this chapter.
19. The interim phase of the regulatory program is dealt with in § 502 of the Act. 30
U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. III 1979). This section specifies which of the twenty-five performance
standards will become immediately operative during the interim phase.
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503 of the Act allows the OSM to turn over to the respective states the
responsibility for implementing and administering the Act, provided each
state submits its own permanent surface mining program to the 0SM10
for approval,2 1 and subject to the further qualification that the OSM con-
tinue to monitor and oversee the state enforcement. 22 If a state program
is not approved by the OSM, then the OSM will be charged with the
responsibility of enforcing the entire Act in that state.
The principal regulatory and enforcement provisions of the Act are
found in Title V of the Act.23 Section 50124 directs the Secretary of the
Interior to promulgate rules and regulations that will govern mine opera-
tions during the interim phase. Section 502 delineates the exact provi-
sions of the Act which are applicable to the coal operators during the
interim phase,25 most of which are found in section 515.6 Section 515(b)
establishes twenty-five performance standards, although not every one is
made applicable during the interim phase. The standards that are made
applicable during the interim phase require the coal operator to restore
the land to its prior condition,2 7 to restore the land to its approximate
20. 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (Supp. III 1979). The state program must be in substantial accor-
dance with the Federal Act. The state regulatory authority must be sufficiently staffed so as
to enable it to enforce effectively the state program. Any rule or regulation promulgated by
the state administrative agency must be consistent with the rules and regulations promul-
gated by the Secretary of the Interior. In addition to these substantive provisions, several
procedural requirements must be met before the state program is approved. For instance,
the Secretary of the Interior must solicit and publicly disclose any views that another fed-
eral agency has on the proposed state program. The Secretary must obtain approval of the
Environmental Protection Agency on matters that might relate to air or water quality stan-
dards. At least one public hearing must be held within the respective state. Finally, the
Secretary must be satisfied that the state has adequate legal authority to enforce the state
program. Id.
For a discussion of the program submitted by Virginia, see Brion, Federal Regulation of
Surface Mining in Virginia, 67 VA. L. REv. 329, 332-33 (1981). Virginia's plan was approved
in part and disapproved in part. See 45 Fed. Reg. 69,977 (1980).
21. 30 U.S.C. § 1253(b) (Supp. III 1979). The Secretary must approve or disapprove the
submitted program within six months. The Secretary may approve all, part, or none of it.
22. 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (Supp. III 1979).
23. §§ 501-529, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1279 (Supp. III 1979).
24. 30 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. III 1979).
25. 30 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (Supp. III 1979) provides: "All surface coal mining operations on
lands on which such operations are regulated by a State" shall comply with the provisions of
subsections 515(b)(2), 515(b)(3), 515(b)(5), 515(b)(10), 515(b)(13), 515(b)(15), 515(b)(19),
and 515(d).
26. 30 U.S.C. § 1265 (Supp. III 1979).
27. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979). The surface coal mine operation must "re-
store the land affected to a condition capable of supporting the uses which it was capable of
supporting prior to any mining, or higher or better uses of which there is reasonable
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original contour,2" to segregate and stabilize the topsoil2 and to eliminate
the highwall by complete backfilling.30 In addition to the section 515(b)
performance standards, the Act also has explicit performance standards
relating to steep slope mining. Section 515(d)(2) requires that the mine
operator reclaim the steep slope by "[c]omplete backfilling with spoil ma-
terial"31 so that the highwall will be completely eliminated, and so that
the mine site will be returned to its "appropriate original contour. '32 A
steep slope is defined as "any slope above twenty degrees. 3 3 The district
court found that Virginia was "particularly affected by this legislation be-
likelihood."
28. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(3) (Supp. III 1979). The surface coal mine operation must
"backfill, compact ... and grade in order to restore the approximate original contour of the
land with all highwalls, spoil piles, and depressions eliminated."
29. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(5) (Supp. III 1979) provides:
(5) remove the topsoil fromthe land in a separate layer, replace it on the backfill
area, or if not utilized immediately, segregate it in a separate pile from other spoil
and when the topsoil is 'not replaced on a backfill area within a time short enough to
avoid deterioration of the topsoil, maintain a successful cover by quick growing plant
or other means thereafter so that the topsoil is preserved from wind and water ero-
sion, remains free of any contamination by other acid or toxic material, and is in a
usable condition for sustaining vegetation when restored during reclamation, except if
topsoil is of insufficient quantity or of poor quality for sustaining vegetation, or if
other strata can be shown to be more suitable for vegetation requirements, then the
operator shall remove, segregate, and preserve in a like manner such other strata
which is best able to support vegetation.
30. To understand the terms highwall and backfilling, imagine a triangular-shaped cut
through a mountain. The altitude of that triangle is the highwall, a vertical cliff of about 100
feet. The base of the triangle is called the bench, a horizontal foundation up to 500 feet. The
term backfilling describes the process of returning the material taken out of the cut so that
the highwall is eliminated and the original contour of the mountain is restored. Thus, the
hypotenuse of the triangle would be the original slope of the mountain. UNITED STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, SURFACE MINING AND OUR ENVIRONMENT 42 (1967). See also 30
C.F.R. § 701.5 (1979).
31. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d)(2) (Supp. 11 1979) provides:
(d) Steep-slope surface coal mining standards.
The following performance standards shall be applicable to steep-slope surface coal
mining and shall be in addition to those general performance standards required by
this section: Provided, however, That the provisions of this subsection (d) shall not
apply to those situations in which an operator is mining on flat or gently rolling ter-
rain, on which an occasional steep slope is encountered through which the mining
operation is to proceed, leaving a plain or predominantly flat area or where an opera-
tor is in compliance with provisions of subsection (c) hereof:
(2) Complete backfilling with spoil material shall be required to cover completely the
highwall and return the site to the appropriate original contour, which material will
maintain stability following mining and reclamation.
32. Id.
33. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d)(4) (Supp. 11 1979).
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cause ninety-five percent of its strippable reserves are located on slopes in
excess of twenty degrees."3 4
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION
On October 23, 1978, the Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation As-
sociation ("VSMRA") filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Virginia challenging the constitutionality of the
Act, particularly the statutory provisions that became immediately effec-
tive during the interim phase.35 After a hearing on a motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction, the district court enjoined the Secretary of the Interior
from enforcing any of the provisions found in Title V. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, dissolved the district
court's injunction. During the pendancy of the appeal of the district
court's ruling on the preliminary injunction, the district court conducted
a thirteen-day trial upon the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunc-
tion of the Act's enforcement provisions. Thereafter, the district court is-
sued an order and a memorandum opinion that declared substantial pro-
visions of the Act to be unconstitutional and permanently enjoined their
enforcement.
A. The Commerce Clause Issue
VSMRA attacked the constitutionality of the Act on the theory that
Congress lacked authority under the commerce clause36 of the United
States Constitution to regulate surface mining. VSMRA contended that
land or land use is incapable of being regulated by the federal govern-
ment since land cannot be regarded as being "in commerce. ' 's7 The dis-
trict court was not persuaded by this argument and found that Congress
could, pursuant to the commerce clause, validly regulate surface mining
regardless of whether such legislation is characterized as regulation of an
intrastate activity.' The court deferred to the congressional findings, and
34. 483 F. Supp. at 434.
35. The plaintiffs in the district court advanced several theories as a basis for declaring
the Surface Mining Act unconstitutional. Only those issues that were ultimately appealed to
the Supreme Court, however, will be discussed in this article. Thus, plaintiffs' claims that
the Act violated their fourteenth amendment right to equal protection and their fifth
amendment right to substantive due process will not be considered.
36. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause permits Congress "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes."
37. Brief for Appellee at 12, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101
S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
38, 483 F. Supp. at 430-31. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975) ("Even
activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activ-
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concluded that surface coal mining did in fact have an adverse impact on
interstate commerce. Next, the district court applied the rational basis
test"9 to determine if the means chosen by Congress to regulate surface
mining were rationally related to that end. The district court concluded
"that Congress had a real and substantial rational basis for enacting the
federal surface mining act to protect commerce and the national
interest. '40
B. The Tenth Amendment Issue
In holding that the Surface Mining Act transcends the limitations
placed upon Congress by the tenth amendment, the district court relied
extensively upon National League of Cities v. Usery.4' The district court
framed the issue as "whether the federal surface mining act is directed to
the state as a sovereign entity, displacing its role as a decision-maker in
ity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the
States or with foreign nations."). See also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (Con-
gress has the power under the commerce clause to regulate local loan sharking activities);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (Congress has the power
under the commerce clause to punish hotel operators for refusing to provide accommoda-
tions to persons on account of their race); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (Congress
has the power under the commerce clause to regulate the production of agricultural goods
that are to be consumed only on the farm); Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)
(Congress has the authority under the commerce clause to fix railroad rates even though the
rates were of a purely intrastate character).
39. The rational basis test in commerce clause cases emanates from Chief Justice John
Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."). For a general discussion
of Congress' power under the commerce clause, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 227 (1978).
40. 483 F. Supp. at 431. For instance, Congress recognized the enormous impact of un-
reclaimed or improperly reclaimed surface mining operations on interstate commerce. "If
the land is not reclaimed in a manner that subjects it to further use, then the productivity
of that land is lost to present as well as future generations . . . ." Id.
41. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The Supreme Court's decision in Usery has been the subject of
much criticism and comment. See Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balanc-
ing National League of Cities, 11 GA. L. REV. 35 (1976); Heldt, The Tenth Amendment
Iceberg, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1763 (1979); Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Per-
mutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165
(1977); Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice: Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Imple-
mentation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling
National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Gov-
ernment Services, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1977); Note, Practical Federalism After National
League of Cities: A Proposal, 69 GEO. L.J. 773 (1981); Note, National League of Cities v.
Usery: A New Approach to State Sovereignty?, 48 U. CoLo. L. REV. 467 (1977).
19811
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areas of traditional governmental services, or whether the act is directed
to private activity. '42 After framing the issue, the district court carefully
and painstakingly went through the litany of tests announced in Usery.43
Due to the district court's reliance upon Usery, it is helpful at this
juncture to discuss what the Supreme Court held in that case. Usery in-
volved a tenth amendment challenge to the 1974 amendments to the Fair
Labor Standards Act which extended the minimum wage and maximum
hour provisions to state and public employees. The Court found that the
1974 amendments constituted an "exercise of congressional authority di-
rected . . . to the States as States."'4 4 The Court also found that the
states' power to decide what amount state employees are to be paid and
how many hours they will work are undoubtedly attributes of state sover-
eignty.4 5 Finally, the Court determined that these amendments resulted
in the loss of the states' ability to function in areas clothed with the at-
42. 483 F. Supp. at 432.
43. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Usery poses immense problems in its application by
lower courts due to the litany of terms and tests used to delineate the limits of Congress'
power under the commerce clause. See, e.g., 426 U.S. at 842 (1976) ("Our federal system of
government imposes definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities
of the States as States by means of the commerce power."); id. at 844 (" 'Neither govern-
ment [federal or state] may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial manner the
exercise of its powers.' ") (quoting Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926)); id.
at 845 ("The question we must resolve . . . is whether these determinations [i.e. what
amount of wages are to be paid, who is to receive them and what hours those persons will
work] are '"functions essential to separate and independent existence."' ") (quoting Coyle
v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911) (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71,
76 (1868))); id. at 847 ("forced relinquishment of important governmental activities"); id.
(the congressional enactment speaks "directly to the States qua States"); id. at 849 ("inter-
fere with traditional aspects of state sovereignty"); id. ("substantially restructure traditional
ways in which the local governments have arranged their affairs"); id. at 851 ("interfere with
the integral governmental functions"); id. ("significantly alter or displace the States' abili-
ties to structure employer-employee relationships"); id. ("fundamental employment deci-
sions"); id. at 852 ("impair the States' 'ability to functioneffectively in a federal system'")
(quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)); id. ("directly displace the
States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions"). For a discussion of the difficulty of applying the standards announced in Usery, see
25 EMORY L.J. 937 (1976); Comment, National League of Cities Crashes On Takeoff: Bal-
ancing Under the Commerce Clause, 68 GEO. L.J. 827 (1980); Comment, Constitutional
Law - Commerce Power Limited to Preserve States' Role in the Federal System, 30
RUTGERS L. REV. 152 (1976). See generally Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw:
Balancing National League of Cities, 11 GA. L. REV. 35 (1977); Michelman, State's Rights
and State's Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86
YALE L.J. 1165 (1977).
44. 426 U.S. at 845.
45. Id.
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tributes of state sovereignty.46 The Court concluded that the amendments
violated the tenth amendment because Congress acted in a manner that
was inconsistent with our federal system of government.47
In its consideration of VSMRA's request for a permanent injunction
the district court first examined the effect that the Act had upon Vir-
ginia's regulatory scheme. Even though the Act permits the states to have
their own regulatory programs, the states are nevertheless coerced into a
decision because the Act mandates that the state program comply with
the federal Act in complete detail.4 8 For instance, if the states refuse to
submit a program to the OSM for approval, then the Act expressly de-
clares that any state regulation of surface mining that is inconsistent with
the Federal Surface Mining Act shall "be preempted and superseded by
the Federal program."49 Thus, the district court found that "[t]he choice
that is purportedly given is no choice at all." 50
The district court then discussed how the Act affects the states' ability
to provide essential functions that have been traditionally reserved to the
states. There seems to be little or no dispute that land use planning laws
and zoning ordinances have traditionally been powers exercised by the
states and their localities pursuant to the states' general police powers.8 1
In Warth v. Seldin,52 the Court observed that "zoning laws and their pro-
visions, long considered essential to effective urban planning, are pecu-
liarly within the province of the State and local legislative authorities. '53
Having laid this foundation, the district court held that the Surface Min-
46. Id. at 851.
47. Id. at 852.
48. 483 F. Supp. at 432.
49. § 504(g), 30 U.S.C. § 1254(g) (Supp. II 1979). The subsection further provides that
the Secretary of the Interior shall determine which existing state law is preempted. This
particular provision may lend itself to a successful constitutional challenge since the judicial
branch of government has traditionally determined what state laws are preempted by the
supremacy clause of the Constitution.
50. 483 F. Supp. at 432. The district court relied upon Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548 (1937) and District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), modified
sub noma., District of Columbia v. Costle, 567 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam), for
the notion that states cannot be coerced into making a decision. See also Usery, 426 U.S. at
852 ("freedom to structure integral operations") (emphasis added).
51. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391 (1926); Donohoe
Constr. Co. v. Montgomery County Council, 567 F.2d 603, 609 n.17 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 905 (1978); Note, Tenth Amendment Challenges to the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: The Implications of National League of Cities on
Indirect Regulation of the States, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 601 n.57 (1981).
52. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
53. Id. at 508 n.18.
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ing Act did more than just regulate the manner in which surface mining
operations were conducted. The Act, in effect, regulates the way land is
used. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the Act interfered
with the states' ability to make decisions in areas that have traditionally
belonged to the states. 4
The district court went on to explain the enormous degree of intrusion,
particularly in Virginia, that the Act caused. The court held that the Fed-
eral Surface Mining Act effectively takes away the control that Virginia
has over its own economic development. No longer can a state or its polit-
ical subdivisions decide what the best possible use of its land should be.
The court noted that level land is a precious commodity in the mountain-
ous areas of Virginia. As a result of surface mining in those areas, there
has been a substantial increase in the amount of level land available for
development. For instance, schools, airports, recreation areas and shop-
ping centers have been constructed on reclaimed surface mines. The Act,
however, requires the mine operators to take level land and return it to
its approximate original contour. Consequently, the States have relin-
quished to the federal government the right to decide on how best to de-
velop their own economy.55
Second, the district court found that the Act undermined the state's
economy by reducing the tax base.58 Additionally, Virginia was forced to
spend one and a half million dollars in an attempt to comply with the
Act.57 Finally, the district court held that Virginia is deprived of the op-
portunity to decide how best to protect its environment." In short, the
district court found, upon the basis of the evidence presented at trial,
that the Surface Mining Act operated to " 'displace the States' freedom
to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions'" and " 'substantially restructure[d] traditional ways in which the
local governments have arranged their affairs."'"
54. 483 F. Supp. at 433.
55. Id. at 434.
56. Id. The basis of this determination was a startling decline in the area's coal produc-
tion immediately following the effective date of the Act. "[C]oal companies have gone out of
business; between five hundred and one thousand coal miners have lost their jobs; income
from surface mining permits has decreased; the coal-based revenues that the counties [in
southwest Virginia] rely on to operate have been reduced." Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 435 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 849, 852 (1976)).
As a result of the district court's findings, it permanently enjoined the enforcement of
§ 515(d) and (e) of the Act. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d) and (e) (Supp. III 1979).
[Vol. 16:179188
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C. The Taking Issue
VSMRA argued that sections 51560 and 52261 of the Act violated the
fifth amendment right to due process in that property was taken without
just compensation.2 It contended that the Act on its face amounts to a
taking of private property. In support of this contention, VSMRA relied
strongly upon Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon.6 3
The district court analyzed Pennsylvania Coal Co. and found that the
facts in the present case stand on all fours with the facts in Pennsylvania
Coal Co.:64
In Virginia the evidence shows that surface landowners are possessed of
small tracts usually less than one hundred acres. The requirement of return
to approximate original contour amounts to a physical restriction on the
removal of coal. The landowner cannot remove his coal because it is eco-
nomically and physically impossible to comply with the steep slope reclama-
tion provisions of the act. Because of the nature of the land, the owner is
thereby deprived of any use of his land, not only the most profitable. Moun-
tainous terrain is unusable for all income producing activities unless it is
level, which the act is aimed at preventing. 5
On the basis of these facts, the court declared the approximate original
contour provisions to be a constructive taking of private property without
60. See notes 26-33 supra and accompanying text.
61. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(4), (5) (Supp. III 1979) provides that no surface coal mining oper-
ations shall be permitted under the following conditions:
(4) within one hundred feet of the outside right-of-way line of any public road, ex-
cept where mine access roads or haulage roads join such right-of-way line and except
that the regulatory authority may permit such roads to be relocated or the area af-
fected to lie within one hundred feet of such road, if after public notice and opportu-
nity for public hearing in the locality a written finding is made that the interests of
the public and the landowners affected thereby will be protected; or
(5) within three hundred feet from any occupied dwelling, unless waived by the
owner thereof, nor within three hundred feet of any public building, school, church,
community, or institutional building, public park, or within one hundred feet of a
cemetery.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part: "[n]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."
63. 260 U.S. 393* (1922). In addition to Pennsylvania Coal Co., the district court dis-
cussed many of the more recent Supreme Court decisions on taking. See Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51 (1979); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962).
64. 483 F. Supp. at 441.
65. Id. The court comments in a footnote that these findings of fact are supported ironi-
cally enough by the federal government's own studies. Id. at 435 n.11.
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just compensation and, therefore, unconstitutional. In addition to this
holding, the district court also declared section 522 to be unconstitutional
because that section included a wholesale prohibition on surface mining
within a specified number of feet from occupied dwellings, schools,
churches, public parks and cemeteries, as well as any other land that the
appropriate state regulatory authority found to be unsuitable for
mining.6
D. The Procedural Due Process Issue
The enforcement provision of the Act, 7 VSMRA contended, violated
procedural due process rights8 because cessation orders could be issued
by the OSM without the benefit of a prior hearing. VSMRA also argued
that since section 51869 of the Act requires the surface mine operator who
has allegedly violated a provision of the Act to pay the proposed penalty
before he is allowed to contest the existence of the violation or the
amount of the proposed penalty, it deprived him of his due process guar-
antees. In response to this, the Secretary of the Interior argued that the
66. Id. at 441-42.
67. 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2), (3) (Supp. III 1979). Under § 1271(a)(2), the Secretary has the
authority to issue cessation orders if an OSM inspector first determines that there is "immi-
nent danger to the health or safety of the public" or "significant, imminent environmental
harm to land, air, or water resources." Section 701(8) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1291(8) (Supp.
III 1979), defines "imminent danger to the health and safety of the public" as conditions
that could "reasonably be expected to cause substantial physical harm to persons outside
the permit area before such condition, practice, or violation can be abated." A reasonable
expectation of death or serious injury exists "if a rational person, subjected to the same
conditions or practices giving rise to the peril, would not expose himself or herself to the
danger during the time necessary for abatement."
Under § 1271(a)(3), the Secretary has authority to issue a cessation order if an OSM
inspector finds that the surface mine operator has failed to abate a violation.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part that no person shall "be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law."
69. 30 U.S.C. § 1268(c) provides:
(c) Notice; waiver. Upon the issuance of a notice or order charging that a violation of
the Act has occurred, the Secretary shall inform the operator within thirty days of
the proposed amount of said penalty. The person charged with the penalty shall then
have thirty days to pay the proposed penalty in full or, if the person wishes to contest
either the amount of the penalty or the fact of the violation, forward the proposed
amount to the Secretary for placement in an escrow account. If through administra-
tive or judicial review of the proposed penalty, it is determined that no violation
occurred, or that the amount of the penalty should be reduced, the Secretary shall
within thirty days remit the appropriate amount to the person, with interest at the
rate of 6 percent, or at the prevailing Department of the Treasury rate, whichever is
greater. Failure to forward the money to the Secretary within thirty days shall result
in a waiver of all legal rights to contest the violation or the amount of the penalty.
[Vol. 16:179190
SURFACE MINING
court had no jurisdiction to decide the procedural due process issue since
there was no case or controversy.70 Specifically, the Secretary contended
that the issue was not ripe for adjudication because none of the plaintiffs
had ever received a summary cessation order under section 521(a), nor
had any of the plaintiffs suffered any loss as a result of the issuance of a
summary cessation order.7 1
The district court determined that the challenge was not premature
and held that the issuance of cessation orders without giving the surface
mine operator an opportunity to be heard violated the plaintiffs' due pro-
cess rights. In the court's view, requiring a surface mine operator to pay
the proposed civil penalty before being given the chance to challenge the
existence of a violation or the amount of the penalty is violative of the
fifth amendment.1 2 In holding as it did, the district court applied the Ma-
thews v. Eldridge3 balancing formula:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirements would entail. 7 '
Of particular concern to the court was the fact that a multi-million dollar
operation could be completely shut down by a process that deprived the
most affected party of an opportunity to be heard. The court also noted
that the applicable standard under section 521(a) lacked any meaningful
objective criteria.75 The court ultimately concluded that the additional
costs and administrative burden that would result from a pretermination
hearing were "relatively insubstantial"76 when weighed against competing
factors.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, the
Supreme Court, for the first time since National League of Cities v.
70. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
71. Brief for Appellant at 62, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101
S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
72. 483 F. Supp. at 447-48.
73. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
74. Id. at 335.
75. 483 F. Supp. at 448.
76. Id. at 447.
19811
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Usery,77 elaborated upon the proscription to Congress' exercise of its
commerce power found in the tenth amendment.8 As to the fifth amend-
ment taking issue and the fifth amendment procedural due process issue,
the Court applied earlier case law and reversed the district court on both
issues.7 Other possible challenges to the constitutionality of the Act re-
main open because the Court held that several of the issues decided by
the district court were not yet ripe for adjudication.
A. Can Nonfederal Lands Be The Subject of Congressional Regulation
Pursuant to the Commerce Clause?
The Supreme Court gave an emphatic "yes" to the question of whether
nonfederal lands can be the subject of congressional regulation through
the commerce clause and dispelled any doubts concerning the extent and
scope of Congress' power under that clause.80 The commerce clause is a
grant of plenary power.81 The power to regulate commerce between the
states is "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the constitu-
tion."'82 If Congress finds that a particular activity substantially affects
interstate commerce, then, regardless of how indirect that effect is, or
how local in character that activity is, Congress may validly regulate that
activity subject only to the limitation that it have a rational basis for such
legislation. Thus, a reviewing court becomes merely a rubber stamp, de-
ferring to Congress' findings and rationale.
In the face of overwhelming precedent, VSMRA argued that land is an
exception to this general rule." To support this position it argued that
77. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
78. 101 S. Ct. at 2364-69.
79. 101 S. Ct. at 2369-74.
80. Justice Rehnquist, however, indicates that the commerce clause itself may limit Con-
gress' power. "Thus, it would be a mistake to conclude that Congress' power to regulate
pursuant to the Commerce Clause is unlimited." 101 S. Ct. at 2391. He then concludes that
the Surface Mining Act is within those undefined limits and adds that "there can be no
doubt that Congress in regulating surface mining has stretched its authority to the 'nth
degree." Id. To support his assertion that the commerce clause has its own built-in limits,
Justice Rehnquist relies upon dicta from past Supreme Court decisions. See NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 327
(1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554-55 (1935).
81. 101 S. Ct. at 2360. See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 840; Cleve-
land v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
82. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 9 (1824).
83. Brief for Appellee at 11-25, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
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the property clauses4 of the United States Constitution and cases there-
under impliedly reject any congressional authority to regulate the use of
nonfederal lands.8 5 The Court, however, dismissed this argument without
comment, apparently finding that the property clause is a separate and
distinct power that poses no obstacles for Congress in the exercise of its
powers pursuant to the commerce clause.
After a discussion of the legislative history of the Act and a recitation
of the congressional findings, the Court upheld Congress' authority, find-
ing that surface mining affected interstate commerce and that Congress
had a rational basis for enacting the Surface Mining Act. Justice Rehn-
quist in his separate opinion, however, disagreed with the majority's
statement of the test. "In my view, the Court misstates the test. . . .[I]t
has long been established that the commerce power does not reach activ-
ity which merely 'affects' interstate commerce. There must instead be a
showing that regulated activity has a substantial effect on that com-
merce."8 6 Congress' findings in this particular case would doubtless sat-
isfy either test, although section 101 of the Act is devoid of the term"substantially affects commerce." However, it may be argued successfully
in future cases that Congress has failed to make the necessary findings to
support regulation of particular local activity.,
84. The property clause of the United States Constitution provides: "The Congress shall
have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the terri-
tory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
85. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976)(The property clause does not
authorize "an exercise of a general control over public policy in a State," but only "an exer-
cise of the complete power which Congress has over particular public property entrusted to
it."); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958); Federal Power Comm. v.
Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955)(The Federal Power Commission has authority over navigable
waters under the commerce clause, but has authority over nonnavigable waters that are
located within federally owned lands only under the property clause.); United States v. City
& County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 19 (1940); United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174
(1935); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 87-89 (1906). In addition to the cases construing
the property clause, VSMRA points to language in McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 396
(1876)("Commerce has nothing to do with land while producing, but only with the product
after it has become the subject of trade.").
86. 101 S. Ct. at 2391.
87. This may seem to be a trivial point, but the Court was quite concerned in the Hodel
case about the lack of any congressional finding to the effect that highwalls substantially
affect interstate commerce.
"QUESTION: [J. White]: Mr. Buscemi, what does [Congress'] investigation show
the effect on commerce is or may be if there is surface mining of coal without restor-
ing the ... high wall? . . .I can understand why surface mining might be said to
affect commerce, but that wouldn't mean that anything that Congress said, ordered
with respect to surface mining would have an effect on commerce.
MR. BUSCEMI: I think that's correct.., but I think in particular the high wall
1981]
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B. The Tenth Amendment: Still a Truism
In 1941, the Court characterized the tenth amendment as a "truism,"'
noting that '[t]here is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest
that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the na-
tional and state governments."8 Prior to that decision, the Court had in-
regulation that you, or the high wall statutory provision that you refer to is very
closely connected to preventing adverse environmental effects from surface
mining....
QUESTION: ... [Y]ou mean anything that affects the environment affects com-
merce? Is that your suggestion?
QUESTION: Well, you still haven't suggested to me what the effect on commerce is
... of not restoring the [land to the approximate original] contour but flattening it
and covering it some other way.
MR. BUSCEMI: ... I refer you to the findings that Congress made in Section 101
of the statute.
QUESTION: Well, you go ahead and tell me what impact on commerce it has.
That's what I'm asking you.
QUESTION: I can understand all of that but I still don't identify in that listing
[i.e., recitation from § 101 of the Act] any specific impact on commerce by a failure to
restore the original contour when these steep places are mined."
Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-10, 12-13, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
88. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
89. Id. When the States were still debating whether to accept the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton were instrumental in persuading the
various state legislature to vote for ratification, and in calming the fears of those who clung
tightly to principles of state sovereignty. In FEDERALIST NUMBER 45, Madison attempts to
quiet the widespread apprehension that the States as political entities would be obliterated
by the powers of the federal government:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are
few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous
and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war,
peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will,
for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend
to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties,
and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement and prosperity of
the State....
If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be found
that the change which it proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW POW-
ERS to the Union, than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS [i.e. those
possessed by the Articles of Confederation]. The regulation of commerce, it is true, is
a new power; but that seems to be an addition which few oppose, and from which no
apprehensions are entertained.
J. KILPATmICK, THE SOVEREIGN STATES 32 (1957) (quoting FEDERALIST NUMBER 45 (J.
Madison) (emphasis added). It seems ironic that the inclusion of a new power that the origi-
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validated several federal regulatory schemes on the ground that Congress
had exceeded its express powers and had invaded the exclusive province
of the states." More recently, the Court has become conscious of federal
intervention into a state's sovereignty, and, accordingly, has imposed lim-
its upon Congressional power and judicial interference.91
The Hodel decision has apparently recast the tenth amendment as
merely a "truism," and in so doing has restricted the applicability of
Usery to its facts. In Hodel, Justice Marshall announced a three-part test
to be used in deciding whether a federal statute enacted pursuant to the
commerce clause violates the limitations found in the tenth amendment:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the
"States as States." Second, the federal regulation must address matters that
are indisputably "attributes of state sovereignty." And, third it must be ap-
parent that the States' compliance with the federal law would directly im-
pair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
functions. 92
He then concluded that the Act does not violate the tenth amendment
because it does not regulate the states qua states. Consequently, the sec-
ond and third elements of the test were never considered.
The Court stated that the Act is aimed at "cooperative federalism" and
that it was similar to other environmental acts which have successfully
survived tenth amendment challenges.9" For instance, in United States v.
Helsley,9' the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the Airborne
nal states' rightists did not fear has reduced the tenth amendment to a truism.
90. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 560-61 (1923) (overruled in West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937)); Hamner v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276
(1918) (overruled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)).
91. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (The 1974 amend-
ments to the Fair Labor Standards Act operate directly to displace the states' ability to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, and therefore
transcend the limits placed upon Congress by the tenth amendment.); Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974) (The eleventh amendment prevented damage awards against the
states.); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (Principles of equity, comity and federalism
require a federal court to abstain from interfering in an ongoing state criminal prosecution.).
The Younger doctrine has since been expanded to noncriminal proceedings. Moore v. Sims,
442 U.S. 415 (1979); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434
(1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
92. 101 S. Ct. at 2366 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845, 852,
854 (1976)).
93. 101 S. Ct. at 2366.
94. 615 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1979).
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Hunting Act 95 was violative of the tenth amendment. Likewise, in
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Carey6 and Sierra Club v. EPA,97 the Clean
Air Act9" was declared to be constitutional.9 It appears that Congress'
aim of "cooperative federalism" has missed its mark when one considers
that eight states filed an amicus curiae brief in support of VSMRA's po-
sition'0 0 and two other states have challenged the constitutionality of the
Act in federal court litigation. 10 1
In response to the district court's findings that the Act displaces essen-
tial functions traditionally provided by the states, Justice Marshall
pointed to the supremacy clause stating that Congress could, pursuant to
the commerce clause, decide to prohibit all state regulation of surface
95. 16 U.S.C. § 742j-1 (1972).
96. 552 F.2d 25; 36-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
97. 540 F.2d 1114, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977).
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. II 1978).
99. 101 S. Ct. at 2366 n.30. The legitimate interest that Congress had in enacting the
Clean Air Act is not present in the Surface Mining Act with the same strength. Air, as well
as navigable water, is an element common to all states. Contamination of the air or water
has serious environmental effects upon states from which the contamination did not origi-
nate. The same reasoning does not necessarily apply to the regulation of land. See Engdahl,
Some Observations on State and Federal Control of Natural Resources, 15 Hous. L. REV.
1201 (1978); Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977).
100. The states of Arizona, Hawaii, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Washington
and Wyoming filed a brief as amici curiae in support of VSMRA's and the Commonwealth
of Virginia's position.
101. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va.
1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981); Concerned Citizens of Appalachia, Inc. v. Andrus, 494 F.
Supp. 679 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1325 (S.D.
Iowa 1980); Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Ind.), rev'd sub nom. Hodel v. Indi-
ana, 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981). In Concerned Citizens of Appalachia, the district court held
that the Surface Mining Act did not effect a taking of private property without just compen-
sation in violation of the fifth amendment, that it did not deny surface mine operators their
procedural due process rights and that the tenth amendment is not violated when a federal
statute regulates private enterprises. In Star Coal Co., the plaintiff was seeking a prelimi-
nary injunction against the enforcement of various provisions of the Act. The district court
held that the Act did not contravene the tenth amendment or amount to a taking under the
fifth amendment. The district court, however, did issue a preliminary injunction against the
enforcement of § 518(c) of the Act, finding that the plaintiffs showed a substantial likeli-
hood of prevailing on the merits. Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) at 1330. In
Indiana v. Andrus, the district court declared substantial portions of the Surface Mining
Act to be unconstitutional. For a detailed account of the district court's decision in Indiana
v. Andrus, see Note, The Constitutionality of the Federal Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, 13 IND. L. REV. 923, 964 n.261 (1980).
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mining.102 "Although such congressional enactments obviously curtail or
prohibit the States' prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting
subjects the States may consider important, the Supremacy Clause per-
mits no other result." 103 Yet, the Court seems to miss the thrust of
VSMRA's argument and the district court's decision. VSMRA did not ar-
gue that, because the Surface Mining Act preempted state regulatory
schemes, the tenth amendment had been violated. Instead, VSMRA con-
tended that the Surface Mining Act does much more than just preempt
conflicting state laws. The Act in effect relegates the states to a role sub-
servient to a federal administrative agency. Land use planning decisions
and decisions relating to economic development and state environmental
protection have been taken away from the states.104
In Sierra Club v. EPA,105 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the tenth amendment is not violated if "[t]he states retain
broad discretion under the regulations to control the use of their land in
the scope of their economic development."118 It seems clear under this
test that the Surface Mining Act impinges upon the right. reserved to the
states by the tenth amendment. 10 7 But, the Supreme Court impliedly re-
jected the District of Columbia Circuit test. In order to transcend the
tenth amendment, the Act must regulate the state as a state. Apparently,
the level of interference and the degree to which the state's ability to
structure integral operations is impaired are factors that are totally irrele-
vant unless the federal law directly regulates the states. The Court stated
102. 101 S. Ct. at 2367.
103. Id.
104. See Note, Tenth Amendment Challenges to the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act of 1977: The Implications of National League of Cities on Indirect Regulation
of the States, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 601-608 (1981).
105. 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Even before Usery, the Court had recognized that
federal statutes which afford the states the option to participate in federal programs with-
stand a tenth amendment challenge. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316-17 (1968);
Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295-96 (1958); Steward Mach. Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (tenth amendment not violated if congressional legislation in-
duces, rather than coerces, the states into compliance). See also Eichbaum & Buente, The
Land Restoration Provisions of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act: Consti-
tutional Considerations, 4 HARv. ENVT'L L. REv. 227, 253 n.147 (1980).
106. 540 F.2d at 1140.
107. See, e.g., Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). Steward Mach. Co. in-
volved a challenge to the Social Security Act of 1935. The Court held that the tenth amend-
ment was not violated if the autonomy of the states was not destroyed or impaired. Id. at
586. Cf. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom.
EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) ("A federal regulation which compels the states to enforce
federal regulatory programs clearly 'impairs the states' integrity' and 'their ability to func-
tion in a federal system.' ").
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that VSMRA's "Tenth Amendment challenge ... must fail because...
the statute. . . regulates only 'individuals and businesses necessarily sub-
ject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and the
State in which they reside.' ,o8
After Hodel, the decision in Usery has been reduced to an anomaly in
the law. Its applicability to other situations has, for the time being, been
greatly diminished. But, the Hodel decision cannot be regarded as a de-
parture from existing case law. Neither can it be looked upon as unex-
pected; Justice Blackmun foreshadowed the result in his concurring opin-
ion in Usery: "[I]t seems to me that [the Court] . . . does not outlaw
federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the fed-
eral interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance
with imposed federal standards would be essential. 10 9
Justice Blackmun also noted in his concurring opinion in Usery that
the Court was employing a balancing test to decide whether a valid exer-
cise of Congress' commerce power would violate the tenth amendment.10
The Court in Hdel made clear that a balancing test is applied, but only
after the three requirements of the Hodel test have been established."'
Thus, a reviewing court must first determine whether the federal legisla-
tion in question directly regulates the states in areas that have tradition-
ally been delegated to state governments. If the court determines that the
108. 101 S. Ct. at 2369.
109. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
110. Id. See also Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaning for the
Tenth Amendment?, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 161, 164 (Usery "would thus transport us from a
regime which has sacrified states' sovereignty for congressional supremacy to a regime in
which the Court will balance states' rights against interests represented by Congress.");
Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing National League of Cities, 11
GA. L. REV. 35, 73 (1976) (After Usery the Court will balance Congress' power to regulate
commerce and the economy against the states' tenth amendment guarantee to be free to
make decisions in areas that have traditionally been reserved to the states.); Kilberg & Fort,
National League of Cities v. Usery, Its Meaning and Impact, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 613,
632 (1977) (National interests will be balanced against the legitimate needs of state and
local governments.); Note, Practical Federalism After National League of Cities: A Propo-
sal, 69 GEo. L.J. 773, 780 (1981) ("the majority's treatment of Fry and Justice Blackmun's
concurrence point to the conclusion that Usery employs a balancing test that evaluates af-
fected federal and state interests and examines the suitability of the chosen means to ac-
complish the federal end"); Note, Emerging Concepts of Federalism: Limitations on the
Spending Power and National Health Planning, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133, 1151 n.119
(1977) (Usery suggests that the Court is balancing state and national interests).
111. 101 S. Ct. at 2366 n.29. "Demonstrating that these three requirements are met does
not, however, guarantee that a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional commerce
power action will succeed. There are situations in which the nature of the federal interest
advanced may be such that it justifies state submission." Id. (authorities omitted).
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states qua states are not being regulated, or that the matter being regu-
lated is not an attribute of state sovereignty, or that the states' ability to
function effectively in those areas has not been impaired, then the court's
inquiry is at an end, and the challenged legislation must be held to have
not violated the proscriptions of the tenth amendment. But, if the court
finds all three requirements to be present, the court must engage in a
balancing test to see whether the federal government's interest is demon-
strably greater than the states' interest in retaining their sovereignty. The
problem that reviewing courts face in the future is the Court's failure to
provide any meaningful guidance in balancing the federal government's
legitimate interest against the states' legitimate interests. The only re-
deeming aspect of this problem is that reviewing courts will rarely en-
counter the unpleasant judicial task of balancing these two interests.
C. The Surface Mining Act Does Not on its Face Result in a Taking1 12
The district court ruled that sections 515(d)-(e) and 522 of the Act re-
sult in an unconstitutional taking of private property without just com-
pensation. 113 The Supreme Court held that the district court's ruling on
the taking issue "suffers from a fatal deficiency."'' None of the plaintiffs
in the district court could identify any specific piece of property "that
ha[d] allegedly been taken by operation of the act.' 'll Consequently,
there was no concrete factual setting upon which the district court could
base its decision.
The Court proceeded to explain that surface mine operators may have
a remedy against the intrusive nature of the Surface Mining Act. If a
surface mine operator desires to mine coal on land above twenty degrees
and cannot do so because of the approximate original contour provision,
then he may challenge the act at that time as being an unconstitutional
112. See Brion, Federal Regulation of Surface Mining in Virginia, 67 VA. L. REV. 329,
343-49 (1981); Eichbaum & Buente, The Land Restoration Provisions of the Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act: Constitutional Considerations, 4 HARv. ENVT'L L. REV.
227, 244-50 (1980); Note, Regulation Without Just Compensation: A Political Process-
Based Taking Analysis of the Surface Mining Act, 69 GEo. L.J. 1083 (1981); Note, The
Constitutionality of the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 13
IND. L. REV. 923, 945-56 (1980). See generally L. TRmE, AMEPICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
456-65 (1978); Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 165
(1974); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Note, Reexamining the Supreme
Court's View of the Taking Clause, 58 TEx. L. REV. 1447 (1980).
113. See notes 63-66 supra and accompanying text.
114. 101 S. Ct. at 2369.
115. Id.
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taking of private property. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion made
this point perfectly clear: "The 'taking' issue remains available to, and
may be litigated by, any owner or lessee whose property interest is ad-
versely affected by the enforcement of the Act."116
There is no "set formula" to determine when government action will
cause the necessary degree of economic injury so that "justice and fair-
ness" will demand the private party be justly compensated for his loss. 1127
"Taking" questions by their very nature require an ad hoc factual inquiry
into several relevant factors: (1) the impact of the economic injury upon
the person being regulated; (2) the degree of governmental regulation of"reasonable investment backed decisions;" and (3) the characterization of
the government action. 18
In response to the lack of an actual factual setting, VSMRA relied upon
the 1922 Supreme Court decision of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon."'
In that case, Justice Holmes laid down the guiding principle for lower
courts in deciding when governmental regulation will amount to a taking:
"The general rule . . . is, that while property may be regulated to a cer-
tain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.' 20
This principle has endured and is not inconsistent with the more recent
decisions of the Court. Justice Marshall's opinion did not address Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. specifically. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon was not a
facial challenge to governmental legislation. Instead, the plaintiffs in the
lower court presented evidence which demonstrated that a particular
piece of property was constructively taken by a state law.' 2 1 Therefore,
116. 101 S. Ct. at 2375 (Powell, J., concurring).
117. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) where the Court stated
that it had "been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and
fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the gov-
ernment, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." See also
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
118. 444 U.S. at 175. The first two factors seem straightforward but the last factor re-
quires elaboration. Generally, if the government action can be characterized as a physical
invasion of a person's property, then such action is likely to constitute a taking. See, e.g.,
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (federal government's invasion of airspace
destroyed use of farm beneath). Likewise, where the government requires assets that facili-
tate a uniquely public function, then such action is vulnerable to constitutional attack. Cf.
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 128, 135 (1978) (government
action does not usually result in a taking when the interference results "from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good."
Id. at 124). See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-96 (1962).
119. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
120. Id. at 415.
121. Id. at 413. In 1921, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a bill that forbade the mining
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Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon was inapposite to the Court's decision
in Hodel.
Since the district court was not presented with a claim that the Surface
Mining Act constituted a taking of a specific parcel of land, the only issue
for the Court to decide was whether the Act on its face amounted to a
taking. Only if the Act denied the surface mine operator the "economi-
cally viable use of his land" would the result be a taking.122 The Court
held that the Surface Mining Act easily survived judicial scrutiny under
this test. Justice Marshall noted that none of the plaintiffs at the district
court proceeding availed themselves of the various administrative reme-
dies, and specifically referred to the variance provision in section
515(d)123 and the waiver provision in section 522(e). 124 Justice Marshall's
reference is somewhat misleading. Section 515(d) does allow the appropri-
ate regulatory authorities to grant the surface mine operator a variance
on restoring the land to its approximate original contour. The variance,
however, is conditional upon the surface mine operator backfilling com-
pletely so as to eliminate the highwall. For all practical purposes, the va-
riance procedure is a futile remedy since the approximate contour provi-
sion must still be fulfilled. 25 Section 522(e)(4), one of the waiver
of anthracite coal in a manner that would cause the subsidence of any dwelling house. The
case before the Supreme Court involved only one private dwelling. The Pennsylvania Coal
Co. argued that the Pennsylvania statute destroyed their property rights to mine anthracite
coal under the house in question, since a deed prior to the enactment of the statute con-
veyed the right to remove anthracite coal from under the house.
122. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
123. See notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text.
124. See note 61 supra.
125. The Secretary of the Interior acknowledged the futility of the variance remedy in a
comment to the proposed regulations. See 44 Fed. Reg. 61313 (1979). Tollage Creek Elkorn
Mining Co., IBSMA 80-32 (November 24, 1980), exemplifies the futility of the procedure. In
that case, the Interior Board of Surface Mining Appeals reviewed a notice of violation
charging that the mining company had not restored the land to its approximate original
contour. The owner of the surface rights had planned to use the land for a tree farm after
the surface mining was completed. In furtherance of this plan, the landowner had obtained
a permit from the appropriate regulatory authority in Kentucky which allowed a variance
for the purpose of planting a tree farm. Despite the permit which the landowner had ob-
tained, the Interior Board of Surface Mining Appeals upheld the violation. The Board
noted:
Common sense and fairness would appear to require an opposite result. The Federal
law seems inescapable, however. Had Congress been presented with the factual situa-
tion here, where elimination of the highwall would not benefit the environment but
only burden the operator or landowner, it may have provided in the Act for some
exception to the rigid backfilling requirements.
Brief for Appellee at 32-33, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S.
Ct. 2352 (1981).
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provisions, allows the appropriate regulatory authority to permit surface
mining operations within 100 feet of a public right-of-way only after there
has been an opportunity for a public hearing and a determination that
the public will nevertheless be protected. 2 ' Section 522(e)(5) also con-
tains a provision permitting surface mining within other previously
restricted areas if the adjacent landowner agrees. However, section
522(e)(5) still retains a blanket prohibition on surface mining within so
many feet of any public building, school, church, community building, in-
stitutional building, public park or cemetery.
The most persuasive reason that the Act withstands judicial scrutiny is
that the land can be leveled first without ever being surfaced mined. The
Court noted that "if flat bench land is truly as valuable as the court be-
low found, there should be no financial impediment to the reestablish-
ment of flat areas on the sites of some old mining operations, once those
areas have been restored and stabilized in the manner required by the
Act.,)127
The Court concluded that the mere enactment of the Surface Mining
Act does not deprive the surface mine operator of the economically bene-
ficial use of his land, and therefore does not on its face take private prop-
erty without just compensation.
D. Summary Cessation Orders
Section 521(a)(2) and (3) authorize the Secretary of the Interior to is-
sue cessation orders before the surface mine operator is given an opportu-
nity to be heard. 128 The Secretary, in his discretion, can order total or
partial cessation of the surface mining operations upon a showing of an
emergency or upon a showing that the surface mine operator has not
abated a violation within the appropriate time period. If a cessation order
is issued, the affected surface mine operator can immediately seek tempo-
rary relief from the Secretary. 29 Upon such a request, the Secretary must
respond within five days. 30 Assuming that the Secretary denies the re-
quest for temporary relief, the affected party may appeal the Secretary's
126. See note 61 supra.
127. 101 S. Ct. at 2370 n.38.
128. See note 68 supra.
129. See § 525(c) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1275(c) (Supp. III 1979). When a surface mine
operator seeks relief from a summary cessation order issued pursuant to § 521(a)(2) or (3) of
the Act, the Secretary must review the request immediately. The surface mine operator
must demonstrate a substantial likelihood of prevailing upon the merits before the Secre-




decision to the appropriate federal district court."" The district court
found this review procedure unconstitutional for two reasons: (1) the eco-
nomic injury suffered as a result of a surface mining operation being shut
down for only five days is so great that due process mandates a
pretermination hearing; and (2) the criteria for issuing a summary cessa-
tion order gives too much discretion to an OSM field inspector.1 3 2
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court in both respects:
The Court stated that, ordinarily, due process requires a hearing prior to
the deprivation of life, liberty or property. A clearly recognized exception
to this rule, however, is that "[s]unmary administrative action may be
justified in emergency situations."133
The Court then undertook a balancing test to determine whether sum-
131. See § 526(c) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1276(c) (Supp. III 1979).
132. See notes 67-76 supra and accompanying text.
133. 101 S. Ct. at 2372. See also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663, 677-680 (1974) (Pre-seizure notice and hearing does not deny property owners due pro-
cess when the government's interest is the prevention of continued illicit use of the property
and the enforcement of criminal statutes.); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)
(Due process requires that "an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is
deprived of any significant property interest, except for extraordinary situations where some
valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the
event.") (emphasis in original); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599-600
(1950) (Court upheld § 304(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act which author-
ized the seizure of misbranded articles without a prior hearing if there was probable cause to
believe these articles were dangerous to the health of the public); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332
U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947)(Due to the delicate nature of banking institutions and the impossi-
bility of preserving credit during an investigation, it is not unconstitutional to provide a
hearing after a conservator has been appointed to a federal savings and loan association.);
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 442-43 (1944) ("when justified by compelling public
interest the legislature may authorize summary action"); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S.
503, 519-20 (1944) (the fact that the landlord is not afforded a hearing prior to the time the
Office of Price Administration fixes the amount of rent that can be charged does not violate
the due process clause "where it is essential that governmental needs be immediately satis-
fied"); Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 241 (1944) (bank may take possession
of inactive accounts without prior hearing to determine abandonment); Phillips v. Comm'r,
283 U.S. 589, 595-97 (1931) (immediate collection of taxes prior to hearing does not deny
taxpayer due process); North American Coal Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315-21
(1908) (legislature may order summary destruction of property without a prior hearing in
order to protect public health).
Of particular concern to the Court in Hodel was the Buffalo Creek flood disaster. Con-
gress found this flood to be but one example of the dangerous conditions existing through-
out the coal industry. The "Buffalo Creek Flood" resulted in the death of 124 people and in
4,000 people being left homeless, The reported cause of this disaster was the collapse of a
mine waste impoundment in West Virginia. H.R. REP. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 129-
30 (1977); See H.R. REP. No. 94-1445, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976). Congress sought to
eliminate this type of danger by providing for summary cessation orders.
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mary administrative action was warranted. In this case, the Court bal-
anced "the legitimate desire of mining companies"' 4 to have a
pretermination hearing against "the governmental interest in protecting
the public health and safety and the environment from imminent dan-
ger."1 5 The Court concluded, on balance, that the government interest
was paramount and justified summary administrative action.'
Justice Marshall next refuted the district court's reasoning that the
standards for issuing cease and desist orders lacked sufficient objective
criteria. He relied principally upon several provisions found in the Act
and regulations that define more fully the standards in section 521.37
Comparing the Surface Mining Act to other acts, Justice Marshall stated
that "these standards are more specific than the criteria in other statutes
authorizing summary administrative action that have been upheld against
due process challenges.' 3 8
The Court addressed the point made by the district court that OSM
inspectors may be abusing their discretion.'3 9 The fact that an OSM in-
spector may have overstepped his authority was held not to be relevant to
the issue of whether the statute provided due process. The proper inquiry
was "whether the statutory procedure itself is incapable of affording due
134. 101 S. Ct. at 2372.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Section 701(8) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1291(8) (Supp. III 1979) defines "imminent
danger to the health and safety of the public." See note 68 supra. The Secretary's regula-
tions also define "imminent danger to the health and safety of the public" and "significant,
imminent environmental harm." The regulation defining "imminent danger to the health
and safety of the public" recites verbatim the language found in the statute. The term "sig-
nificant, imminent environmental harm" is defined in the following manner:
(i) An environmental harm is any adverse impact on land, air, or water resources,
including but not limited to plant and animal life.
(ii) An environmental harm is imminent, if a condition, practice, or violation exists
which-
(a) is causing such harm; or,
(b) may reasonably be expected to cause such harm at any time before the end of
the reasonable abatement time that would be set under Section 521(a)(3) of the
Act.
(iii) An environmental harm is significant if that harm is appreciable and not imme-
diately reparable.
30 C.F.R. § 701.5 (1979).
138. 101 S. Ct. at 2373.
139. Cf. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950) ("Discretion of
any official may be abused. Yet it is not a requirement of due process that there be judicial
inquiry before discretion can be exercised.").
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process."' 140 The Court did indicate, however, that a pattern of abuse
might be enough to declare the summary procedure unconstitutional. 142
E. Imposition of Civil Penalties
Section 518(c) 14 2 requires the Secretary to notify the surface mine oper-
ator that he has been charged with violating one of the provisions of the
Act. In addition, the affected party is notified of the amount of the pro-
posed civil penalty. Only if the party forwards the amount of the pro-
posed penalty will he be given an opportunity to contest the existence of
the violation or the amount of the civil penalty. 43 The district court
found this waiver provision to be particularly egregious. On appeal, the
Supreme Court declined to rule on the merits since none of the plaintiffs
in the district court demonstrated that they had suffered any injury as a
result of this section. The Court concluded that the challenge to section
518(c) was not justiciable because the claim was premature.'4
Of all the claims that VSMRA brought, this claim seemed to have the
best chance of prevailing on the merits. It has never been a requirement
of American jurisprudence that a defendant in a civil setting or a quasi-
criminal setting must pay the proposed fine as a condition of defending
himself. 45 Section 518(c), in effect, requires the adversely affected party
to purchase the opportunity of defending himself.
In Ex parte Young, 46 Justice Peckham, writing for the majority,
declared:
It may there be said that when the penalties for disobedience are by fines so
enormous and imprisonment so severe as to intimidate the company and its
140. 101 S. Ct. at 2373. See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 435 (1944) ("Only
if we could say in advance of resort to the statutory procedure that it is incapable of afford-
ing due process to petitioners could we conclude that ... their constitutional rights have
been or will be infringed.").
141. 101 S. Ct. at 2373 n.45. "A different case might be presented if a pattern of abuse
and arbitrary action were discernable from review of an agency's administration of a sum-
mary procedure." The district court had based its decision upon the issuance of three cessa-
tion orders to one coal company, all three of which were ultimately vacated as erroneous. As
a result of the shutdown, the coal company lost $160,000 in recoverable coal and expended
$15,000 in attorneys' fees. 483 F. Supp. at 445.
142. For a discussion on the prepayment of penalties, see Note, Procedural Due Process
and the Prepayment of Civil Penalties: The Surface Mining Act - A Paradigm for Future
Legislation, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 87 (1978).
143. See note 69 supra.
144. 101 S. Ct. at 2374.
145. See Note, supra note 144, at 96.
146. 209 U.S. 123 (1907).
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officers from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation, the
result is the same as if the law in terms prohibited the company from seek-
ing judicial construction of laws which deeply affect its rights.147
The principle enunciated by Justice Peckham is easily made applicable to
administrative review. The operation of this statute would tie up needed
capital for an indeterminate amount of time.148 Arguably, this result in-
timidates the surface mine operator into complying with the OSM's or-
ders to abate an alleged violation that would ordinarily be contested not-
withstanding the waiver provision. The inevitable effect of this procedure
is to chill the surface mine operator's statutory right to seek administra-
tive review.
V. CONCLUSION
Clearly the Hodel decision does not change the existing law with re-
spect to the commerce clause issue, the "taking" issue, and the procedural
due process issue. The Court applied established principles of constitu-
147. Id. at 147. See also Natural Gas Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300 (1937); Oklahoma Op-
erating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331 (1919); Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651
(1915). The decision in Natural Gas Co. involved a statute that imposed penalties on a daily
basis. Likewise, § 518(a) of the Act states that "[e]ach day of continuing violation may be
deemed a separate violation for purposes of penalty assessments." 30 U.S.C. § 1268(a)
(Supp. III 1979). The Court in Natural Gas Co. struck down the state statute as being
violative of the due process clause. "Any application of the statute subjecting appellant to
the risk of the cumulative penalties pending an attempt to test the validity of the order in
the courts ... would be a denial of due process." 302 U.S. at 310.
Wadley Southern Ry. Co. stands for the principle that a statute imposing civil penalties is
unconstitutional if the affected party is deterred from challenging the orders.
A statute ... which imposes heavy penalties for violation of commands of an unas-
certained quality, is in its nature, somewhat akin to an ex post facto law since it
punishes for an act done when the legality of the command has not been authorita-
tively determined. Liability to a penalty for violation of such orders, before their va-
lidity has been determined, would put the party affected in a position where he him-
self must at his own risk pass upon the question. He must either obey what may
finally be held to be a void order, or disobey what may ultimately be held to be a
lawful order. If a statute could constitutionally impose heavy penalties for violation of
commands of such disputable and uncertain legality the result inevitably would be
that the carrier would yield to void orders, rather than risk the enormous cumulative
... punishment that might be imposed if they should thereafter be declared to be
valid.
235 U.S. at 662-63.
Based upon the language of Ex parte Young, Natural Gas Co. and Wadley Southern Ry.
Co., the Act's cumulative penalty provision coupled with the waiver provision in § 518(c)
seems especially vulnerable to a fifth amendment due process challenge.
148. See Brief for Appellee at 58, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
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tional law to the Surface Mining Act and properly concluded that the Act
did not violate the fifth amendment or exceed the scope of the commerce
clause. Yet the Court indicates that relief for individual surface mine op-
erators may be appropriate if a reviewing court were to make an ad hoc
factual inquiry into the relevant factors, and determine that a "taking"
had occurred. Furthermore, the Act's civil penalty provisions may yet be
declared unconstitutional. Thus, the Hodel decision is probably not the
death blow that the surface mining industry might envision.
Hodel is important for purposes of the interpretation of the tenth
amendment. Although the decision certainly cannot be characterized as a
departure from earlier precedent, it nevertheless signals a halt to any pos-
sible erosion of Congress' power under the commerce clause as a result of
the Usery decision. Usery now appears nothing more than an anomaly.
Certainly Usery will not be extended into areas that are not closely analo-
gous to its facts. In summary, Hodel makes clear that the tenth amend-
ment is not violated unless there is direct regulation of the states as
states, regardless of the degree of intrusion into the domain that was once
occupied by the states.
Timothy W. McAfee
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